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Abstract 
Paediatric endocrinology is a highly specialised area of clinical medicine with many experts with 
specific knowledge distributed over a wide geographical area. The European Society for Paediatric 
Endocrinology (ESPE) is an example of such a body of experts that require regular collaboration and 
sharing of data and knowledge. This paper describes work, developed as a corollary to the VOTES 
project [1] and implementing similar architectures, to provide a data grid that allows information to be 
efficiently distributed between collaborating partners, and also allows wide-scale analyses to be run 
over the entire data-set, which necessarily involves crossing domain boundaries and negotiating data 
access between administrations that only trust each other to a limited degree. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An emergent result of the ever-shrinking, 
Internet-enabled world is the need for linking 
data sets that are distributed across 
technological and geographical boundaries. 
Nowhere is this need more apparent than in the 
various specialised areas of clinical medicine, 
where individual experts located at great 
distances from each other, generate specific 
data-sets that have the potential to be used with 
other data-sets, which are similar in nature, 
and which provide the perfect opportunity for 
distributed collaboration. 
 
The requirement for a technology 
infrastructure to underpin such data linkage 
and sharing is rapidly evolving from a 
desirable product to a necessity Grid 
Computing addresses this requirement through 
the development of “data grids” – distributed 
groups of entities (commonly referred to as 
“Virtual Organisations”) that facilitate data 
sharing, whilst enforcing rigid yet flexible 
security policies that allow parties to 
collaborate whilst maintaining a limited level 
of trust between each other. 
 
Paediatric endocrinology has been identified as 
a specialised clinical area with distributed 
expertise that would greatly benefit from just 
such a technological infrastructure. The 
European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology 
(ESPE) [2] is composed of some of the leading 
experts in this particular field. The sites 
involved have isolated individual computer 
systems in place that serve the needs of local 
clinicians, specialists and general practitioners, 
and are located at variously distributed centres 
throughout Europe – Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands, Pisa in Italy, Lubeck in Germany 
and Glasgow and Cambridge in the UK. This 
distribution of centres which provide a 
multitude of local services, yet have this 
specialised data in common, exemplifies a 
particular issue that Grid technology deals with 
directly: the notion of limited trust between 
collaborating parties. 
 
In this sense, the partners that are collaborating 
in a virtual organisation are only partners for 
the duration of that collaboration. The 
assumption is that the VO has a transient 
lifetime and that current partners could be 
potential competitors for other projects. As 
such, it is necessary to only give access to the 
data-sets that are required for the current 
collaboration. The notion of context must also 
be supported so that information is controlled 
relative to how it could be used in other 
projects. These are non-trivial research 
questions that provide the driving force for 
study into Grid technologies. 
 
This paper describes the work that would be 
involved in implementing such a system, the 
nature of the data and the schemas concerned, 
the detailed security aspects that must be 
considered, and the implementation work that 
has been conducted so far. 
 
2. Distributed Paediatric Data 
 
The paediatric data involved in the ESPE 
project focuses on the aspects of congenital 
anomalies occurring in children, the analysis 
of which essentially defines the gender of the 
child. The data focuses on the primary, 
secondary and tertiary causes of disorders of 
sexual development (DSD), with a DSD 
register that encapsulates the symptoms and 
diagnoses for the various patients. The 
individual data sets and computer systems that 
exist across Europe have been developed 
largely in response to the needs of local 
clinicians. As such, the schemas and data 
classifications that have evolved within each of 
the different sites, though describing broadly 
the same data, have many features 
idiosyncratic to their own region. 
 
This classification issue is one of the central 
challenges when attempting to federate data 
and presents that initial building block upon 
which all other features must be founded (e.g. 
how can one enforce a security policy upon 
objects when the exact concept of how to 
classify and describe that object and its context 
is ill-defined?) 
 
There are two main paradigms that could 
potentially solve the question of matching 
heterogeneous data descriptions: global 
schemas and ontologies. 
 
The idea behind a global schema is that an 
over-arching and static definition exists that 
matches every possible data description to a 
common schema. This has the benefit of 
providing a clear and un-ambiguous 
classification of data objects within this field. 
However it is also a highly static solution – 
requiring regular maintenance of what could 
potentially be a large and unwieldy document. 
Scope for dynamically adding new resources 
to this setup would be very limited. 
 
The construction of an ontology is to define an 
interface that allows differing schema sets to 
essentially “talk” to each other. The benefit 
behind this is that the interface can be defined 
as per the needs of the schemas being added or 
removed, without impacting on other 
interfaces. However, it does also require an 
overhead of work in matching one schema to 
another each time another is added. 
 
Several global initiatives are underway to 
attempt to standardise the data description 
languages currently in use. SNOMED-CT [3] 
and HL7 [4] represent two of these standards 
that will provide a unified framework. 
However, much work is still required before 
they are to be adopted on a widespread scale 
throughout the clinical community. 
 
No matter how it is achieved, the motivation of 
having a classification to marry these various 
descriptions together is obvious – not only can 
data access across the distributed sites be 
effectively policed, but a variety of functions 
can be performed over the enhanced data-set 
that will bring immense value to the 
boundaries of knowledge within this field – 
e.g. statistical calculations, the ability to map 
visual graphs and correlations, and the ability 
to highlight similarities and discrepancies in 
the trends from differing regions. 
 
Given the nature of the data being federated, 
the sensitivity must be treated as extremely 
high and the security and safe-guarding of this 
data, and the interests of the patients involved, 
must be paramount in all discussions of system 
design and implementation. 
 
3. Security 
 
As with all clinical data, security – particularly 
the security of the patient’s interests – is 
paramount. The main challenge in enforcing 
security policies across distributed, 
heterogeneous environments, is where to strike 
the balance between having a rigid enough 
policy to effectively prevent system abuse, and 
being flexible enough to allow the benefits of 
data federation to be realised (e.g. the most 
secure system would be a locked box 
disconnected from any network – but this 
would be of little use for data sharing or 
collaboration). 
 
3.1 “AAA” 
 
As with all software solutions, a system can 
only be considered secure if adequate 
processes are in place that address the 
fundamental tenets of security. In Grid 
computing these are traditionally labelled as 
the “AAA” concepts: 
 
• Authentication – establishing and verifying 
the identity of an individual. 
 
• Authorization – once the identity has been 
verified, establishing what access controls 
that identity is subject to. 
 
• Accountability – in the event of system 
abuse or security breach, being able to 
correctly tie the actions of a user to their 
identity. 
 
With these three processes in place, it is 
possible to identify, limit access and have 
recourse to any users that attempt to abuse the 
system or any data stored within.  
 
Authentication 
 
The authentication process is covered in many 
systems by the use of username/password 
combinations, the identity of which is stored 
on a database within the system. However, in 
terms of applying this to a virtual organisation, 
there is a need for a more sophisticated 
distributed model. As such, the paradigm for 
single sign-on (SSO) – which allows a local 
user to have a remote identity – is now 
implemented for many of the projects 
undertaken at NeSC-Glasgow. 
 
Shibboleth [5] a technology that provides the 
ability to transfer attributes between entities 
signed up to a common federation, is rapidly 
gaining widespread acceptance throughout the 
academic community. This allows users to 
authenticate to a local institution – who are 
more likely to be able to verify the veracity of 
that identity – but have access (subject to 
agreed policies) to resources at other 
institutions signed up to that same federation.  
 
This distributed model of authentication allows 
a policy of flexible access to distributed 
resources, whilst also allowing tight locally-
enforced powers of revocation to be 
established. The implications of being able to 
use a similar model in the context of the ESPE 
project are immediately obvious – distributed, 
yet limited, access to remote resources at a 
level controlled by the local resource-owner.  
 
Authorization 
 
One of the major factors in developing Grid 
solutions is the need for a solution that will 
scale to the potentially large number of users 
that will use the system. In specialised and 
focused cases such as this, the numbers are 
potentially lower than in generic solutions, 
which are often the main focus of Grid 
research.  
 
However, the issue of scalability must still be 
addressed. In terms of security, the first step to 
make the lists of users manageable across a 
wide domain, is by implementing the concept 
of role-based access control (RBAC). This 
immediately makes the number of entities to 
identify and restrict more manageable – the 
role must be secured rather than the individual 
user, and administration is de-coupled to the 
linkages between user and role, and role and 
resources. 
 
In terms of data federation, the role-based 
approach allows pre-set views to be 
implemented that restrict the data sets 
available. This is the most efficient way of 
securing access to individual data fields within 
databases in terms of grid services. The 
authorization process must be implemented on 
each role – delimiting what data fields can and 
cannot be viewed or updated. The concept of 
an access matrix has been introduced to 
provide a framework that matches role against 
data parameter – if a “1” is present in the 
matrix, then that role can access that 
parameter, if a “0” is present it can’t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual representation of the access 
matrix framework: role versus parameter, and user 
versus role. 
 
Many authorization technology solutions are 
under development within the Grid community 
[6, 7] but most of these do not meet all the 
requirements of adequately securing data 
access in a Grid environment. As such, the 
access matrix concept is being implemented in 
this project using a combination of simple 
database relationships (as shown in figure 2) 
and JDBC communication streams between 
portal, matrix and grid services. 
 
 
Figure 2: Entity-Relationship diagram representing 
the access matrix database.(Note this is re-used in 
the VOTES project, so “Trial” here is represented  
by “Project”. 
 
The roles distributed so far include the 
differences between consultants and 
investigators as the most privileged roles, and 
nurses as the less privileged role. The low-
privilege roles do not have access to the upload 
portal and only have limited access to the 
query portal. 
 
Accountability 
 
A major requirement of the collaborative 
sharing of the ESPE data is an audit trail of 
who has accessed, read and edited the data. 
This is ordinarily an area that is left till the 
later stages of most Grid projects. However the 
demand from the production context has put it 
forward as of being of great importance. 
 
The need for an audit trail of course points to 
the need for accountability in the event of a 
security breach. However the main driving 
motivation on the part of the ESPE project is 
to know who has originally uploaded the DSD 
records, so to check upon consistency and 
validity of records. This underlines to a certain 
degree, the notion of limited trust between 
parties mentioned in the section 1.  
 
It also provides the opportunity to enable more 
mainstream security in terms of flagging 
suspicious behaviour, or retrospectively 
trailing malefactors in the event of a security 
breach. The audit trail itself will be available in 
logs within the grid server, accessible by the 
system administrator. However, the need for 
clinician accountability requires information – 
such as identifying the clinical user, the upload 
time and the read time – to be coded into the 
individual patient records returned. 
 
Static legal considerations 
 
Because of the semi-autonomous nature of the 
sites involved in this project, and hence the 
between all the nodes within the VO, a static 
context is required which will establish a base-
level of trust between the parties. Due to the 
security considerations above, it is necessary 
for users with administrative rights to grant 
rights to users over remote resources. To 
implement this in any system requires a high 
level of trust between the acting parties, which 
in turn will require a legal form of recourse 
should either party feel that their grant of 
administrative rights has been abused. 
Therefore, a static element to this dynamic 
system is unavoidable (and indeed necessary). 
The question then becomes what interactions 
between the node super-users are delineated in 
the static agreement and what can be assumed 
at run-time. 
 
 
 
 
4. Implementation 
 
Figure 3 shows the current architecture used 
that links the ESPE database to a web portal 
through the use of grid services. 
 
 
Figure 3: Architectural diagram of data grid 
constructed for the ESPE project. 
 
The basic operation is as follows: 
 
• The user logs into the portal at a particular 
node - this can be directly or via Shibboleth 
(not shown above).  
• The portal server checks the local resource 
files to discover the available grid servers, 
data servers and driving databases. 
• A request containing the user’s role and a 
specific trial is sent to the grid server. 
• The grid server consults the local access 
matrix and returns the parameters for the 
resources that the user can query for that 
trial. These are presented to the user as a 
list of check-boxes, with the option to 
specify conditions if desired. 
• The user makes their selection of 
parameters and submits them. These are 
constructed into a single query distributed 
across the various resources. 
• The query is sent from the grid server to 
the data server, where it is wrapped as an 
OGSA-DAI service request and is passed 
to the driving database. 
• The driving database executes the 
distributed query over the resources under 
its guard and joins the various distributed 
results into one single result. 
• This result is sent back to the data server 
and then to the grid server, where it is 
transformed into readable HTML and 
finally presented to the user through the 
portal again. 
 
The technology used to implement this 
architecture is as follows: 
 
• GridSphere [8] to implement the portal that 
provides user-friendly access to the system. 
• Globus Toolkit v4 [9] to implement the 
grid service that links the UI layer to the 
data layer, whilst providing an 
intermediary layer, where the security 
principles can be implemented. 
• OGSA-DAI [10] is used to filter the grid 
service SQL query into an XML format 
more easily used for rendering in the 
portal. 
• The data store used in the Glasgow site is 
PostgreSQL [11]. However, this will differ 
across the various sites involved – the 
Rotterdam site uses [12] 
 
Figure 5 (at the end of the paper) shows a 
screen-shot of the interface that is provided to 
the user when using the system. Two portals 
are used – one for querying the records and 
one for uploading data to the centralised 
repository of data. 
 
The communication protocols used are SOAP 
(Simple Object Access Protocol) between 
entities and JDBC (Java DataBase 
Connectivity) for accessing the data store. The 
access matrix is implemented by using a set of 
relational tables within a PostgreSQL database. 
This delimits the roles, parameters and access 
rights associated with each role. The database 
is queried from an SQL statement, which 
returns the parameters relevant to that role, 
presented to the user in a user-friendly 
graphical interface. 
 
The user then selects the relevant data 
parameters that they wish to query and upload. 
This selection is constructed into a distributed 
SQL statement which is sent to the database 
via the grid server. The results are returned 
through the same conduit back to the portal, 
again presented in a user-friendly format. 
 
In terms of the use of Shibboleth to facilitate 
the authentication mechanism, the portal has 
been made more user-friendly by inserting the 
roles for the different trials into the Shibboleth 
role database. This overcomes the largely static 
model of security upon which Shibboleth 
federations are based. In the UK a core set of 
eduPerson attributes have been agreed for UK–
wide Shibboleth federations. Extending this to 
support more dynamic VO-specific roles and 
attributes is essential 
 
 
 
Figure 4: the Shibboleth attributes relevant to the 
user “guest2”. Note how the user has different roles 
for different trials, with varying levels of privilege. 
 
4.1 Production Security 
 
Because this is a system that will enter a 
production context in a relatively short space 
of time, the system must also be considered 
secure in terms of not just the unsolved 
research questions, but also in terms of real 
protection against malefactors. 
 
The main issues raised in this context are as 
follows: 
 
• Validating all data that is entered into the 
portal. These points of entry provide the 
opportunity to enter escape codes or byte-
code that could surrender control of the 
portal server to a malicious third-party (e.g. 
the modus operandi of the buffer overflow 
attack). 
• Encrypting all communications between 
components of the architecture. This 
includes SOAP calls between portal and 
grid servers and JDBC connections from 
grid server to database. 
• A list of grid servers exist that must be 
encrypted and protected. This would be an 
effective point of attack to redirect the 
operation of the system to another URL. 
• The access matrix must be encrypted and 
protected. This is potentially the most 
important component in the system – if 
roles and authorization privileges can be 
modified by a malicious third-party, the 
consequences would be high indeed. 
 
This list is by no means exhaustive but does 
highlight the security precautions that must be 
applied to all systems of this nature. 
 
The distributed system also has failed over 
components to allow continuous operation in 
the event of the loss of a single component. 
The portal, grid servers and databases are co-
located in several machines, with a 
connectivity test being performed upon portal 
load-up. An issue that still remains to be 
implemented is the ability to replicate the 
contents of the database at the end of a session, 
or during a session to allow consistently 
synchronised real-time, multi-user access. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined a system, shortly to 
enter a working context that effectively brings 
the paradigms of Grid technology to allow 
secure yet flexible data-sharing and 
collaboration between partners in a highly 
specialised yet geographically distributed field. 
 
Given the sensitivity of the data involved, the 
primary emphasis of the system is on security. 
The authorization processes involved use a 
home-grown system that meets the 
idiosyncratic requirements of this field, as 
opposed to the authorization solutions 
currently on offer in the Grid community, none 
of which entirely meet the needs of this 
project. Similarly, Shibboleth has been 
adopted as a single sign-on solution, which, as 
an attribute transfer mechanism, provides an 
effective method of securely navigating 
throughout virtual organisations and 
federations of partner sites in just such a 
context as this. 
 
The architecture and technology used here is 
believed to be to be a well-supported, robust 
framework that is ideal for use in a clinical 
environment. Other projects conducted at 
NeSC-Glasgow that involve using Grid 
technology in a similar context, are the 
VOTES project, studying patient recruitment, 
data collection and study management within 
clinical trials and studies, and the BrainIT 
project [13], which grid-enables access and 
linkage between neurological MRI scan data in 
the Southern General Hospital, Glasgow. The 
ultimate aim for all these projects is to create a 
single, unified Grid infrastructure that brings 
these many different strands of medical 
expertise together in a single, coherent and re-
usable framework. 
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Figure 5: A screen-shot of the ESPE data upload portlet. The parameters show the details that are 
pertinent to the data set involved. A unique ID for each record uploaded is shown at the top. The query 
portlet replicates this information but allows a search on identifying number and the masculinisation 
score (calculated from the data collected in the GenitaliaAtPresentation section). 
